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Abstract
Technological developments for disabled athletes may facilitate their competition in standard elite sports. They raise
intriguing philosophical questions that challenge dominant notions of body and normality. The case of ‘bladerunner’ Oscar
Pistorius in particular is used to illustrate and defend ‘transhumanist’ ideologies that promote the use of technology to extend
human capabilities. Some argue that new technologies will undermine the sharp contrast between the athlete as a cultural
hero and icon and the disabled person that needs extra attention or care; the one exemplary of the peak of normality, human
functioning at its best, the other representing a way of coping with the opposite.
Do current ways of classification do justice to the performances of disabled athletes? The case of Oscar Pistorius will be
used to further illustrate the complexities of these questions, in particular when related to notions of normality and
extraordinary performances. Pistorius’ desire to become part of ‘normal’ elite sport may be interpreted as an expression of a
right to ‘inclusion’ or ‘integration’, but at the same time it reproduces new inequalities and asymmetries between
performances of able and dis-abled athletes: we propose that if one accepts that Pistorius should compete in the ‘regular’
Olympic Games, this would paradoxically underline the differences between able and disabled and it would reproduce the
current order and hierarchy between able and disabled bodies.
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Introduction
There is a growing academic interest in issues that
relate to sports, disability and classification [1–3].
Academics from a variety of disciplines deal with
questions like: ‘Can we objectively classify human
beings in sport?’, ‘Should health and disability be
defined in objective or contextual terms?’ [4,5].
‘How does the ideology of normalcy relate to elite
sport?’ [6]. These questions arise from a broader
philosophical debate on ‘performativity’, the theore-
tical notion that disability is ‘performed’ instead of a
static fact of the body [7,8]. They are nourished by a
more general debate on disability and theories of
social justice [9,10]. The case of South African
sprinter Oscar Pistorius, also known as ‘the fastest
man on no legs’, has particularly stimulated the
academic interest from a variety of disciplines
[11–18].
Pistorius is an outstanding athlete, who had the
desire to compete at the Olympic Games. Running
with carbon-fibre legs he is world record holder in
the 100, 200 and 400 m and can even compete with
elite athletes on ‘natural legs’. His desire to
participate in a regular competition is surrounded
by controversy and raises a variety of both empirical
and (sport) philosophical questions dealing with the
concepts of dis-ability, super-ability, enhancement
and a fair competition. It is clear that Pistorius
challenges our understanding of disability and that
his case contributes to the blurring of some tradi-
tional boundaries. New technological artefacts such
as innovative prostheses apparently help to turn
‘disabled’ people into ‘normal’ subjects.
What may be considered ‘normalisation’ in the
context of daily life is at least ambivalent in the
context of elite sport. Running on prostheses may be
defined as an intrinsic aspect of the talent that is
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tested in a competition against ‘relevant others’:
athletes who have the ability to show a similar talent.
Pistorius is still officially classified as ‘disabled’, but
this classification may not be relevant anymore if one
abandons the criterion of species-typical functioning
in favour of a contextual approach, an approach that
looks at how the socio-cultural context of a certain
trait is relevant for this traits definition [18].
In daily life, there is little reason to qualify people
who integrate their prostheses into their ‘lived
bodies’ as impaired. The demarcation between sport
for the ‘normal’ and sport for the ‘abnormal’ rather
demonstrates aspects of our understanding of what is
and what should be considered a ‘normal athletic
body’. Disabled athletes are literally constructed as
such in the context of the culturally robust demarca-
tion between Olympic Games and Paralympic
Games. As is the case with other performance
enhancing methods, the Olympic competition be-
comes a mechanism for evaluating athletes with a
‘normal biological body’ [19]. If Pistorius’ label as
dis-abled does not relate to his body image and way
of life in a non-sports context, what does this mean
for the construction of a boundary between ability
sports and disability sports? Are there valid argu-
ments to exclude him from running against able
bodied athletes? And how does this discussion relate
to the general discussion on classification? We will
attempt to answer these intriguing questions against
the background of the discussion on the definitions
of and demarcations between normalcy and disability
and against the background of current discussions on
‘transhumanism’.
Being disabled as the norm for humanity
In the theoretical framework of the philosopher John
Rawls, those who are at the same level of talent and
ability, and have the same willingness to use them,
should have the same prospects of success regardless
of their initial place in the social system [20]. Social
class, gender or any other contingency should have no
influence on the liberty individuals are to enjoy in the
pursuance of their goals in life. Moreover, social and
economic benefits should be distributed in such a way
that they can reasonably be expected to be advanta-
geous to all those who are worst off in the first place.
Rawls aimed at this distributive justice (thus termed by
him) to compensate for the differences in fortune that
affect our lives. Justice is seen as being independent of
luck and favouring a more equal distribution of harms
and benefits. This idea is still often taken to be the
basis for how we deal with issues surrounding the
social inclusion of the disabled [1–3].
People with impairments of any kind cannot
partake in society (and sport) as fully as they should,
according to the principles of distributive justice. The
principles of distributive justice therefore demand
that we redesign the world around us to make it more
accessible for everybody. This necessitates an answer
to the question what obstacles can and should be
taken away in order for the persons with disabilities to
become part of other spheres of life. Making a public
building accessible for the disabled is one but making
elite sport accessible to them is another. Elite sport is,
by definition, constructed around the notions of
differentiation, categorisation and selection, all with
the cause of showing ‘virtuosity’, ‘supremacy’ and
‘super-humanness’. Our dominant understanding of
elite sport cannot be brought in agreement with some
type of right to become an elite athlete on the basis of
a right to a context in which all starting positions are
equal. This is different from the right, for example, to
receive good education. If one defines normalcy as
average, excellence, by definition, excludes normalcy.
Differences between performances of able and
disabled athletes can not be inferred from a defini-
tion of ‘the normal’. Modern elite sport celebrates
abnormalities in many shapes and appearances,
varying from extreme sized sumo wrestlers to
extremely undersized gymnasts. In this light, it
becomes difficult to justify the difference in admira-
tion for the elite athlete and the impaired athlete with
recourse only to concepts such as ‘talent’ or ‘effort’.
Some talents are more valued in a society than
others, in spite of a changing terminology that
sometimes even seems to suggest that being disabled
is an occasional experience of each human being.
If one were to grant a disabled person’s desire to
become part of ‘normal’ elite sport by enhancing one
or more aspects of his body, this may be framed as a
way of ‘inclusion’ or ‘integration’. At the same time,
this reproduces new inequalities and asymmetries
between performances of the able and dis-abled
bodied. To enhance the traits needed to function
optimally in a society, is to take that society as the
proper standard against which the functioning of
people is legitimately judged. Enhancement of
specific traits may count as justice through social
inclusion but one could also defend that a just society
is one in which people are not forced to conform and
are not measured by a single yardstick. In that case,
the yardstick itself should not be seen as neutral: it
appears to be politically biased. When one defines
what counts as a handicap in a contextual rather than
a descriptive fashion, the notion of disability
becomes political.
In contemporary (Western) society, social arrange-
ments are based on the aim to provide people with
the same starting position in life. Abnormalities that
render this starting position inferior are therefore to
be compensated. In many respects, the ideal of the
elite sportsman has all characteristics of abnormality
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as well. However, in contrast to the physically or
mentally challenged, the elite sportsman is not
considered to be subject to societies’ assignment to
normalise people’s starting positions. How ‘extreme’
and ‘beyond normal’ the elite athletes bodies and
outstanding performances may be, they are still
considered as cultural heroes, icons and even as
examples for the average human being (even whilst
some characteristics of elite athletes’ bodies may
pose a handicap in daily life).
Elite sport is about excellence within the bound-
aries of ‘self-chosen’ limitations; disability sports
originated from limitations through fate. Elite sport
symbolises the athlete as hero; it reproduces elitist
ideals about the (‘athletic’ and ‘beautiful’) body,
about good sportsmanship and national pride. For
many people, in disability sport, the athlete is still a
‘patient combating his limitations’, instead of an elite
athlete with specific and outstanding talents.
The case of Pistorius holds a dichotomous con-
sequence for the debate on equality and disability
rights in sport. Pistorius’ not unrealistic desire to
participate in the regular Olympics is illustrative of
how technological progress and changes in definition
blur the distinction between able and disabled,
therefore contributing to the emancipation of the
disabled. But his case may also contribute to an
increased inequality, between those that are techno-
logically ‘enhanced’ and those that are not.
Transhumanists look upon the case of Pistorius
with excited interest, since Pistorius can be used as
an icon for technological progress just as easily as for
equality rights for the disabled. As Camporesi [12]
states: ‘His [Pistorius] case is a snap-shot into the
future of sport. It is plausible to think that in 50
years, or maybe less, the ‘‘natural’’, able-bodied
athletes will just appear anachronistic. As our
concept of what is ‘‘natural’’ depends on what we
are used to, and evolves with our society and culture,
so does our concept of ‘‘purity’’ of sport, and our
concept of how an Olympics athlete should look.’
Transhumanism is a movement that seeks to
advance technology in such a way that it would alter
the human condition to something to which the term
human may no longer be applicable. It seeks to
achieve this through the means of genetic engineer-
ing, artificial intelligence, robotics, nanotechnology,
virtual reality, etc. [21]. The problem with transhu-
manism is that in its desire to improve upon
mankind, it may lead to an increase in the division
between the ‘tech-rich’ and the ‘tech-poor’.
Although Pistorius has no transhumanist aspirations,
his case could be seen a first step towards the
transhumanist dream of a post-humanity. Appar-
ently, Pistorius’ case can be brought forward in
support of equality between able and disabled, but it
may also amount to an inadvertent support of
transhumanism. When posited in support of trans-
humanism, his case may lead to an increase rather
than a decrease of equality.
The ideology of the ICF versus the logic
of sports
The ambiguity of Oscar Pistorius’ status as either a
‘dis’-abled, ‘abled’, or even ‘super’-abled sportsman
carries along some interesting consequences for both
the classification of impairments, disabilities and
handicaps and the classification of disabilities sports
and elite sports. The ‘International Classification of
Impairments, Disabilities and Handicaps’ (ICIDH)
has been replaced by the International Classification
of Functioning, Disability and Health (ICF) at the
start of this century [22]. In general, this change of
terminology reflects a shift in focus from disabilities
to abilities and capacities. Disability is not regarded a
characteristic (that is present all the time) but a state
that may be present in certain environments or
results from specific interactions with other people.
With this change, the concept of health changed
from a bio-statistical (‘objective’) conception to a
more contextual conception. Being disabled is no
longer considered as something one is by definition
(‘by its nature’), but something one becomes in
relation to specific environments [23]. Disabilities
are socio-cultural constructions rather than natural
kinds or given states of being. People can become
disabled by their environment or by specific (lack of)
technologies. A person with an average intellectual
ability may ‘become’ less able in an environment
consisting of highly gifted people. An elite athlete
who chooses not to use performance-enhancing
substances may become ‘dis-abled’ in a context in
which the use of doping is ‘normalised’.
There is still an active discussion on the value of the
ICF. Critics argue that it still leads to a desire to
classify individuals according to disabilities. The
philosopher of health, Lennart Nordenfelt, wrote a
critical article on the ICF in this journal in 2006.
Nordenfelt stated that ‘The will is a crucial notion in
all action theory. But the will is quite absent in the
theory of the ICF. [ . . . ] Ability and opportunity are
not sufficient for the performance of an action . . . one
must first intend to act or want to act’ [24]. According
to this ability-centered theory of health, the ability of
health should be related to the realization of the
person’s vital goals: ‘The ultimate goal should be to
enable the individual and give him or her opportu-
nities to participate in the way and to the extent he or she
wants and chooses to participate’ [25].
What about the vital goals of Oscar Pistorius?
Although this debate on the value of the ICF focused
on the goals of rehabilitation, this case illustrates the
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rather subject-oriented position of Nordenfelt. As
has been put forward by Reinhardt et al. [26] in their
response to Nordenfelt, the will of an individual, how
he or she wants and chooses to participate is, not in
the least in the context of elite sports, highly
restricted by social, political and ideological circum-
stances. Moreover, classification is a sport specific
process and of major importance in all sports.
Handicaps are artificially constructed and defined.
Being a woman is seen as a sport specific ‘handicap’,
otherwise they would be performing together with
men. Being small and light is a handicap in boxing
and wrestling compared to bigger and heavier
athletes. Participation is not based upon an ideology
of ‘inclusion’ and ‘sameness’, but based upon
differences in talent, classified on the basis of
relevant inequalities.
There is a clear friction between Pistorius’
qualification as ‘super-abled’ and his vital goals that
are based upon an alternative understanding of
normality and ability. Most of the empirical studies
on this subject support this label of ‘super-ability’.
Much of the academic debate did not so much deal
with his vital goals, but rather with the empirical
question how his achievements have been influenced
by his artificial legs, therefore not centering on
whether Pistorius should be classified as a disabled
sportsman, but on whether he should be disqualified
as having an unfair advantage. Based on a study by
the Institute of Biomechanics and Orthopaedics
(German Sport University, Cologne), the IAAF
concluded that an athlete running with prosthetic
blades has a clear mechanical advantage (more than
30%) over someone not using blades. Pistorius
responded to this challenge that his prosthetics also
confront him with disadvantages, such as the fact
that he uses more energy at the start of the race than
other runners. Recent findings suggest that running
on lower-limb sprinting prostheses is physiologically
similar to intact-limb elite running (measured in
mean gross metabolic cost of transport), but me-
chanically different (longer foot-ground contact,
shorter aerial and swing times and lower stance-
averaged vertical forces) [11,17].
Even if there is evidence that running with
prosthetics needs less additional energy than running
with natural limbs, this in itself would be an
insufficient argument to keep Pistorius from compet-
ing in the Olympics. There is no standard test
available to judge different bionic legs and compare
them with ‘normal’ legs’ [18]. Besides, ‘if there is any
reason to believe that Pistorius’s prostheses afford
him some degree of unfair advantage [ . . . ] then
surely there has been a similar, nay greater, risk of
unfair advantage in all of his paralympic competing
up to the present’ [16]. Categories within disability
sports are much fuzzier and more variation in the
quality of technology (such as prosthetic limbs) is
accepted within disability sports, which provides
unfair advantages for some of the athletes. But these
unfair advantages within the Paralympic Games do
not seem to be such a high concern by the
International Athletic Federation.
The ideology mirrored by the ICF conflicts with
the discussion on classification within disability
sports, with respect to diverging perspectives on the
meaning of obstacles. Although the ICF aims at the
removal of obstacles (to minimalise any disability),
and Nordenfelt adds to that the will to overcome
obstacles, sport is however defined by a voluntary
attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles [27]. Sport
is about creating ‘artificial dis-abilities’, not about
taking them away.
Prostheses not necessarily define Pistorius as ‘dis-
abled’. On the basis of a definition of his abilities
there is no good argument to exclude Pistorius from
the Olympic Games. Prostheses are however part of
the definition of the game. The question if Pistorius
should be labelled as either super- or dis-abled is not
that relevant for his in- or exclusion. More relevant is
the question what kind of a game is he playing. The
question how to define a game deals with criteria for
the relevant athletic performance. The standards of
excellence for each specific sport are based upon
judgements that are informed by scientific, concep-
tual and ethical evidence [15]. The questions for
example if ‘klapskates’ could officially become part of
the game of long track speed skating, if Fosbury’s
masterful redefinition of high jumping was within the
rules of the game are conceptual matters of definition
and sport ethical analysis (grounded in notions of
fairness and safety) [28]. If re-skilling a technique is
necessary as a result of such redefinitions, than
accessibility of new technology is crucial. The
athletic edge that is gained should always be
attributed to someone’s own athletic skills, and not
on the basis of an unequal distribution of means and
superior technology.
In dealing with such issues of fairness and
definition in sport, the process of decision making
also remains crucial. Who is eligible to make
informed decisions about the rules and definition
of the game and on what grounds? These informed
decisions can be made by a broad practice commu-
nity that have an interest in the quality of the game
itself (such as athletes, coaches, officials, scientists),
that are highly knowledgeable on the sport, but
without apparent (commercial or athletic) interest in
a certain outcome of the decision process. Manu-
factures (and sponsors) of high-tech swimming suits
eventually harmed the game of swimming when they
had too much control on the rules. This was more or
less corrected by the community of swimming itself.
Similarly, it is clear that manufacturers of prostheses
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should not be involved in defining the rules of
disability sports, unless they are clearly involved in
organising an equal distribution of technological
means for each specific category of disability.
Disability sports are about showing performances
within categories of similar disabilities, without
making those disabilities the central element of
athletic prowess. Running on prostheses may be
defined as crucial for the specific talent that is tested
in a competition against ‘relevant others’: athletes
who have the ability to show a similar talent. The
advantages of a prosthesis in this case bear upon the
‘relevant inequalities’ of the sport. Pistorius is not
playing the same game as his opponents because he is
showing another and extra skill, namely handling his
prosthesis in an extremely talented way.
At first sight it seems that the inclusion of Pistorius
in the Olympic Games is in accordance with the
ideology behind the ICF and in accordance with the
realization of his vital goals [5]. It could be argued that
the case of Pistorius blurs the distinction between
elite sports and the disabled sports. His ‘promotion’
to the elite level of sport may be considered as a form
of empowerment and a symbol for non-discrimina-
tion. On the other hand, one can foresee a new
boundary between disabled people into two cate-
gories: first the invalid, dependent and incapacitated
and second ‘that much celebrated media persona of
the disabled person who has ‘overcome adversity’ in a
heartwarming manner and not been restricted by his
or her ‘flaws’, but believes that ‘everything is possible’
for those who work hard’ [16]. Of the limited
available ‘scripts of disability’ [7], the ‘inspirational
overcomer’ dominates the image of the heroic
disabled athlete. The blind runner Marla Runyan
received much less attention for the five gold medals
that she won in the Paralympics of 1992 and 1996,
but really became famous when she competed in the
‘normal Olympics’ in 2000, and finished 8th in the
1500 m. This difference in status confirms the idea
that ‘overcoming a disability’ seems a more out-
standing performance than winning gold in the
Paralympic Games. But when a disability can be
compensated in such a way that the compensation
provides for a ‘super’-ability in a specific context,
compensating for a disability may prove to be a step
beyond ‘normal’ humanity or even a step towards
‘transgressing’ humanity.
The case of Pistorius (and more will follow)
stimulates the ideology of transhumanism, and the
transhumanization of ableism: ‘the set of beliefs, pro-
cesses and practices that perceive the ‘‘improvement’’
of human body abilities beyond typical Homo sapiens
boundaries as essential’ [19]. What is perceived of as
‘better’, as ‘enhancement’ and what not, however, is
up for dispute. If there is no neutral ground on which
to define normalcy and ‘super’-ability, any attempt at
‘going beyond’ normal functioning necessarily is
politics disguised as science. Transhumanism there-
fore is an ideological project. It is the paradox of
Oscar Pistorius that he could develop into a symbol
for the ‘normalization of dis-abilities’, but at the same
time into a symbol of a neo-liberal ideology in which
specific talents of the individual ‘superhuman’ and
‘inspirational overcomer’ [7] are put on the stage as
an heroic example. Pistorius may become a symbol
for both a concept of equality through a justice of
social inclusion and for a concept of inequality
through enhancement towards a form of ‘super’-
humanism.
Conclusion
On the one hand, society invests quite willingly in the
super-abilities of the elite athlete whilst on the other
it only does this reluctantly, and from an ethics of
inclusion, with respect to the disabled. In the case of
disabilities, one wants to eradicate abnormalities by
equalising on the basis of ‘sameness’, while in the
case of super-abilities we support abnormalities. This
‘selective investment in the abnormal’ and the
admiration for the ‘genetically superior’ could be
seen as a token of a society that cannot meet up with
the criteria for justice [10]. On the other hand, sport
is a competitive practice, whose internal logic
consists of the display of an unequal distribution of
abilities and talents.
There are good arguments for a radical change of
the organisation and classification of traditional
sports and for the need of a critical rethinking of the
traditional boundary between Olympic Games and
Paralympic Games. A more successful application of
the notion ‘distributive justice’ would call for a
change of the organisation and classification of tradi-
tional sports. Starting from a more liberal definition
of categories one can also imagine the organisation of
competitions that are not contrasted on the basis of an
opposition between able and dis-able, but rather
around the equal distribution and accessibility of new
technology (including prostheses).
The claim that Pistorius has the right to compete
directly against non-disabled athletes in Olympic
events does not appear to be a strong claim. A
stronger claim can be made for a separate bionic
track event to be part of the Olympics. This however
needs consistent rules on technical aids as well as an
equal and standardised access to new technology.
The inclusion of just one (‘Paralympic’) event will
also create new inequalities and asymmetries bet-
ween performances of able and dis-abled athletes.
Pistorius’ wish to become part of ‘normal’ elite sport
may be framed as a way of ‘inclusion’ or ‘integra-
tion’, but paradoxically underlines the differences
2226 I. van Hilvoorde & L. Landeweerd
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and reproduces the current order and hierarchy
between able and disabled bodies.
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